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Attentional processes governing skilled motor behavior were examined in 
two studies. In Experiment 1, fi eld hockey players performed a dribbling task 
under single-task, dual-task, and skill-focused conditions under both low and 
high pressure situations. In Experiment 2, skilled soccer players performed a 
dribbling task under single-task, skill-focused, and process-goal conditions, 
again under low and high pressure situations. Results replicated recent fi ndings 
regarding the detrimental effect of skill-focused attention and the facilitative 
effect of dual-task conditions on skilled performance. In addition, focusing on 
movement related process goals was found to adversely affect performance. 
Support for the predictive validity of the Reinvestment Scale was also found, 
with high reinvesters displaying greater susceptibility to skill failure under 
pressure. Results were consistent with explicit monitoring theories of choking 
and are further discussed in light of the conceptual distinction between explicit 
monitoring and reinvestment of conscious control. 
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Despite having the ability to execute skills successfully, many athletes 
perform suboptimally in situations that magnify the importance of doing well on a 
particular occasion (e.g., Lewis & Linder, 1997). The term choking under pressure
has been used to describe this phenomenon, defi ned as “the occurrence of inferior 
performance despite striving and incentives for superior performance” (Baumeister 
& Showers, 1986, p. 361). There has been much interest in the attentional processes 
underpinning skilled performance and, in particular, in the role of these processes in 
choking. Much of this research has focused on the disruptive effect of self-focused 
attention on skilled activities (e.g., Baumeister, 1984; Carver & Scheier, 1978) 
where self-focused attention refers to the “capacity [of the self] to take itself as the 
object of attention” (Fenigstein & Carver, 1978, p. 1241). 
In particular, it has been argued that increased pressure to do well heightens 
self-focus, resulting in conscious attention to the step-by-step processes that govern 
performance (Baumeister & Showers, 1986; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Masters, 1992). 
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For example, Baumeister (1984) suggested that, under pressure, performers attempt 
to control their skills consciously but that “consciousness does not contain the 
knowledge of these skills, so that it ironically reduces the reliability and success of 
the performance” (pp. 610-611). Similarly, Masters used the distinctions between 
explicit and implicit processes, controlled and automatic processing, and declarative 
and procedural memory to argue that choking occurs when performers reinvest 
explicit knowledge or controlled processing under pressure. 
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Explicit Monitoring Theories of Skill Failure
In examining the attentional mediators of choking, Beilock and Carr (2001) 
used the term explicit monitoring to refer collectively to self-focus theories of 
choking, arguing that they ultimately refer to the allocation of attention to skill 
execution. Experimental evidence for explicit monitoring includes the fi nding that 
skills acquired in ways that minimize explicit knowledge about how to perform the 
skill are more robust under stress (Masters, 1992). By contrast, individuals who 
accumulate a large pool of explicit knowledge during learning remain vulnerable to 
performance degradation under stress (Liao & Masters, 2002). Masters’ fi nding was 
replicated by Hardy, Mullen, and Jones (1996) and has since been extended using 
different techniques to prevent conscious processing, including analogy learning 
(Liao & Masters, 2001), other secondary tasks (Maxwell, Masters, & Eves, 2000), 
and errorless learning procedures (Maxwell, Masters, Kerr, & Weedon, 2001). 
Additional evidence includes the fi nding that self-awareness adaptation can help 
prevent skill failure under pressure. For example, both Lewis and Linder (1997) 
and Beilock and Carr (2001) found that participants who practiced a golf-putting 
task while being fi lmed subsequently performed better under pressure (induced 
by performance-contingent reward) than those who did not receive adaptation 
training. 
The lack of online attention is refl ected in retrospective recall of few explicit 
rules and relatively impoverished episodic knowledge of mechanics for task 
performance. For example, Beilock and Carr (2001) found that expert golfers had 
a large pool of generic knowledge concerning both how to assess a putt and the 
mechanics of setting up and executing the putting stroke, but had comparatively 
impoverished episodic knowledge of components of the mechanics for specifi c 
putts. The concept of “expertise-induced amnesia” (Beilock & Carr, p. 703) might 
be considered expertise-induced inattention, since knowledge protocols indicated 
that experts had not forgotten the rules but simply attended to them less during 
skill execution.
Additional evidence for explicit monitoring theories comes from research on 
the relationship between attentional demands and expertise. For example, Beilock, 
Carr, MacMahon, and Starkes (2002) found that experienced golfers and soccer 
players using their dominant foot could perform a concurrent secondary tone- or 
word-monitoring task without any detrimental effect on primary motor performance. 
In the soccer-dribbling study, Beilock, Carr, et al. compared experienced and novice 
soccer players’ performance on a dribbling task executed using their dominant and 
nondominant foot under different attention conditions. When dribbling with their 
dominant foot, experienced players performed fastest under dual-task conditions in 
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which they had to repeat a target word that appeared once every three words. They 
performed slowest in the skill-focus condition, in which they were instructed to 
attend to and, upon hearing a tone, report which side of their foot was in contact with 
the ball. Consistent with the relationship between attention allocation and expertise, 
fi ndings were reversed for the nondominant foot, with superior performance under 
skill-focused compared to dual-task conditions (see also Ford, Hodges, & Williams, 
2005; Gray, 2004). 
Individual Differences in the Propensity for Choking
A related line of research has considered individual differences in the tendency 
to become self-focused (trait self-consciousness) and individual differences in the 
propensity for reinvesting conscious control (reinvestment). Baumeister (1984) 
argued that individuals with high trait self-consciousness would perform better under 
pressure than their low self-conscious counterparts because the former would have 
become acclimatized to performing in a self-focused state. He also hypothesized 
that low self-conscious individuals would outperform their high self-conscious 
counterparts in the absence of pressure. He found support for these predictions using 
a motor task that required participants to separate two rods in order to progress a 
ball along a slight incline. As predicted, low self-conscious participants (identifi ed 
using the Self-Consciousness Scale [SCS]; Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) 
performed better in the single-task condition, but were more adversely affected by 
increased pressure. 
By contrast, Masters, Polman, and Hammond (1993) found a signifi cant 
positive correlation between Reinvestment Scale scores and performance failure 
under pressure in participants who had learned a golf-putting task. The Reinvestment 
Scale contains 20 items drawn from three scales that were considered likely to 
predict individual propensity for reinvestment of controlled processing, with 12 
items drawn from the SCS. Subsequent validation work indicated strong positive 
correlations between Reinvestment scores and “stress failure ratings” in varsity 
tennis (n = 12) and squash (n = 12) players (Masters et al., 1993). A recent study, 
again using a novice-learning paradigm in golf putting, similarly indicated that high 
reinvesters were more prone to “choking” (Poolton, Maxwell, & Masters, 2004). 
Furthermore, structural equation modeling revealed a directional association from 
the accumulation of explicit knowledge to Reinvestment score to performance 
under anxiety. 
Current Experiments \\??\
There is a growing body of literature documenting the negative impact of 
explicit monitoring on skilled performance. In addition, there is research examining 
the extent to which dispositional reinvestment or self-consciousness can predict 
skill failure under pressure. Thus far, these factors have been studied in isolation. 
In the present experiments, we aimed to replicate the results of Beilock, Carr, et 
al. (2002) regarding performance under single-task, dual-task, and skill-focused 
conditions, while extending their work by examining the moderating effects of 
pressure and dispositional reinvestment. In a second experiment we introduced a 
task-relevant dual-task condition that required participants to focus on a process 
goal, that is, the behavior the performer will engage in during performance (Kingston 
& Hardy, 1997). 
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Researchers have previously highlighted several benefi ts associated with 
setting process goals such as increased confi dence; however, the apparent paradox 
between the negative effect of explicit monitoring or conscious processing and the 
positive effect of focusing on process goals has also been noted (Mullen & Hardy, 
2000). Kingston and Hardy suggested that the same process goal could serve 
different functions depending on the skill level of the performer. This gives rise to 
the possibility that the function of process goals may change according to situational 
(e.g., perceived pressure) and dispositional (e.g., propensity for reinvestment) 
factors. In both experiments, therefore, we sought to enhance understanding of 
how attentional conditions interact with situational pressure and dispositional 
reinvestment to infl uence skilled performance. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, experienced fi eld hockey players performed a dribbling task 
under single-task, skill-focused, or dual-task attention conditions, under both low- 
and high-pressure situations. In line with previous research on explicit monitoring, 
we predicted that skill-focused attention would disrupt performance relative to the 
single-task condition under low pressure. Reasoning that skill-focused attention 
engenders the same attentional state responsible for skill failure under pressure, we 
further predicted that performance under skill-focus conditions would be equivalent 
under low- and high-pressure conditions. In line with recent fi ndings by Beilock, 
Carr, et al. (2002) and Beilock, Wierenga, and Carr (2002), we predicted that dual-
task conditions would have a slight facilitative effect on performance under low 
pressure situations. Reasoning that performing a dual-task should prevent individuals 
from explicitly monitoring their performance, we further predicted that perfor-
mance in the high-pressure dual-task condition would be better than performance 
in the high-pressure single-task condition (cf. Lewis & Linder, 1997). Regarding 
the Reinvestment Scale, in accordance with the rationale for development of the 
scale, high reinvesters were predicted to be more susceptible to poor performance 
under pressure.
Method
Participants and Measures
Thirty-four fi eld hockey players gave written consent to participate in the 
study. The sample comprised 15 males (mean age 22.8 years, SD = 2.7) and 19 
females (mean age 22.2 years, SD = 4.1) who had competed at club (n = 24), county 
(n = 6), or regional (n = 5) standard, and who were currently competing in fi eld-
hockey leagues in the South of England. Participants had competed at their present 
level for a mean of 4.84 years (SD = 3.33).
Reinvestment Scale. The Reinvestment Scale contains 20 items drawn 
from three scales that were considered likely to predict individual propensity for 
reinvestment of controlled processing (Masters et al., 1993). Twelve items are 
taken from the Self-Consciousness Scale (e.g., “I’m aware of the way my mind 
works when I work through a problem”; Fenigstein et al., 1975). A further seven 
items are taken from the Rehearsal factor of the Emotional Control Questionnaire 
(e.g., “I often fi nd myself thinking over and over about things that have made me 
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angry”; Roger & Nesshoever, 1987). The fi nal item is taken from the Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire (“Do you have trouble making up your mind?”; Broadbent, 
Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982). Data from Masters et al. (1993) indicated that 
the Reinvestment Scale has adequate internal reliability (Cronbach alpha = 0.86) 
and test-retest reliability over a 4-month period (r = .74). 
In the present studies, each item was rated on a 5-point scale from 0 (extremely 
uncharacteristic) to 4 (extremely characteristic), resulting in a possible range of 
scores from 0 to 80. This scale is the same as that in the Self-Consciousness Scale, 
and was used to facilitate comparison of data from two of the Reinvestment subscale 
scores and equivalent normative subscale data from the Self-Consciousness Scale. 
In addition, a review of rating scales by Oppenheim (1992) revealed that 5-point 
scales yield more precise information about respondents’ degree of agreement 
with each item, while Visser, Krosnick, and Lavrakas (2000) reported additional 
advantages for 5-point scales in terms of reliability and validity. To facilitate rating 
using the 5-point scale, the item from the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire was 
written in statement form: “I have trouble making up my mind.” All other items 
remained the same.
State Anxiety. The cognitive and somatic anxiety subscales of the revised 
CSAI-2 (CSAI-2R; Cox, Martens, & Russell, 2003) were used to assess state 
anxiety. Participants rated anxiety intensity on a 4-point scale anchored by 1 (not 
at all) and 4 (very much so) and anxiety direction on a 7-point scale from –3 (very 
debilitative) to +3 (very facilitative). Cox et al. (2003) reported acceptable internal 
reliability coeffi cients of .83 and .88 for cognitive and somatic anxiety subscales, 
respectively. In addition to the CSAI-2R, participants rated how much pressure 
they felt they had been under using a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (no pressure) to 
7 (extreme pressure). 
Task and Procedure
Individuals performed a fi eld-hockey dribbling task on an indoor carpeted 
surface. The task required participants to use the “Indian dribble”1 to move the ball 
around a U-shaped slalom course using either their own stick or one provided by 
the experimenter. The course consisted of 10 cones spaced at 1-m intervals, with 
0.5 m between the start gate and the fi rst cone and between the last cone and the 
fi nish gate, creating a 10-m course. Newtest PowerTimer 1.0 photoelectric cells 
were placed in the start and fi nish gates to record time to the nearest millisecond. 
Upon entering the lab, participants completed a questionnaire eliciting 
background information, followed by the Reinvestment Scale. They were informed 
that they would complete 6 sets of 5 trials, that each trial would be timed, and 
that they would receive specifi c instructions before each set of trials. Finally, 
participants were told that if a signifi cant error occurred in dribbling performance, 
such as missing a cone or using the wrong side of the hockey stick, the trial would 
be repeated (Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002). They were then given the opportunity 
to practice the task. After the relevant instructions but before the fi rst of the 15 
1The “Indian dribble” or “zigzag” refers to an advanced dribbling technique used to 
move the ball from left to right in front of the body. By rolling the left wrist to turn the stick over 
the ball, one uses the open side of the stick to control the ball (Anders & Myers, 1999).
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low-pressure and 15 high-pressure trials, participants completed the relevant items 
from the CSAI-2R. After the last of the low- and high-pressure trials, participants 
completed the pressure-rating item. The order of trials was counterbalanced both 
in terms of pressure and attention condition. Specifi cally, half of the participants 
performed the high-pressure trials before the low-pressure trials while the other half 
performed the low-pressure trials before the high-pressure trials. Within the blocks of 
low- and high-pressure trials, the order of attention conditions was counterbalanced 
with the order of presentation consistent across the two levels of pressure.
Single-Task. Participants were instructed to complete the trials as quickly 
and accurately as possible and were informed that the time taken to complete each 
trial would be used as the measure of performance.
Skill-Focus. In addition to the single-task condition instructions, participants 
were instructed to attend to the movement of their hands throughout the trial, so 
they could verbally indicate (by saying “up” or “down”) whether their left hand 
was in a supine or prone position each time they heard a tone that sounded on a 
6-second variable-interval schedule.
Dual-Task. The dual-task condition used by Beilock, Carr, et al. (2002) 
was changed slightly to improve consistency with the demands of the skill-focus 
condition, while attempting to minimize explicit monitoring. Specifi cally, in 
addition to the single-task condition instructions, participants were instructed to 
generate a random letter of the alphabet each time they heard a tone that sounded 
on the same variable-interval schedule used in the skill-focus condition. Random 
letter generation primarily places demands on the central executive component of 
working memory (Baddeley, 1986) and has been shown to minimize generation and 
use of explicit rules in motor tasks (MacMahon & Masters, 2002). After each set 
of trials, participants were given a rest period of approximately 30 seconds during 
which they were required to count backward from 200 in 12 seconds to prevent 
them from refl ecting on either their performance or the attention manipulation 
(Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002).
Pressure Manipulation. Pressure was induced by the presence of a 
confederate of the same gender as the participant who fi lmed the trials using a 
video camera mounted on a tripod. A cover story was also presented in which 
participants were informed that the footage would be used in a fi lm about research 
into the basic skills of fi eld hockey that the national governing body for fi eld hockey 
was making for nationwide distribution. Both the presence of a video camera and 
evaluation apprehension have previously been used to manipulate pressure (e.g., 
Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Liao & Masters, 2002; Masters, 1992; 
Mullen & Hardy, 2000). At the end of the 30 experimental trials, participants 
completed the postexperiment questionnaire and were fully debriefed as to the 
nature and purpose of the study. 
Data Analysis
Data screening using the Mahalanobis distance method identifi ed one mul-
tivariate outlier, who was removed from the data set. A median split was then 
performed on the Reinvestment Scale score variable to create a group of high (n = 
14) and low reinvesters (n = 14), with mean scores of 52.50 (SD = 3.20, range from 
47 to 57) and 38.07 (SD = 3.99, range from 31 to 43), respectively. Participants with 
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the median score were not included in subsequent analyses. Mean trial completion 
time served as the dependent variable and alpha was set at .05 but was adjusted using 
the Bonferroni correction where appropriate. To avoid issues regarding sphericity, 
and maintain consistency in reporting of results, output from multivariate tests 
using Wilks’ Lambda are reported. Effect size is indicated by multivariate partial 
Eta squared (ηp2) in analyses of variance, and 95% confi dence intervals (95% CI) 
are reported for t-tests.
Results of Experiment 1
Reinvestment and Performance
Mean trial completion times for all participants are illustrated in Figure 1, 
where it can be seen, fi rst, that times were slower under high pressure. Second, 
performance in the dual-task condition was faster than in the single-task condition, 
which in turn was faster than in the skill-focus condition. The data were entered 
into a 3 × 2 × 2 (Attention Condition × Pressure × Reinvestment Group) ANOVA, 
with repeated measures on the fi rst two factors. Results revealed signifi cant main 
effects for Attention Condition, F(2, 25) = 31.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .72, and Pressure, 
F(1, 26) = 36.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .58, but not Reinvestment Group, F(1, 26) = 0.09, 
p = .76, ηp2 = .00. A signifi cant Attention Condition × Pressure interaction was also 
found, F(2, 25) = 3.50, p < .05, ηp2 = .22; however, the above were superseded 
by a signifi cant three-way interaction between Attention Condition, Pressure, and 
Reinvestment Group, F(2, 25) = 4.16, p < .05, ηp2 = .25.
Figure 1 — Mean trial completion time (Experiment 1) for high and low reinvesters 
in the three attention conditions under low and high pressure, with standard error 
bars.
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To follow up the three-way interaction, we conducted separate 2 × 2 (Pressure 
× Reinvestment Group) ANOVAs for each attention condition. In the single-task 
condition, this revealed a signifi cant interaction between Pressure and Reinvest-
ment Group, F(1, 26) = 5.46, p < .05, ηp2 = .17, caused by the negative impact of 
pressure being greater in high reinvesters than in low reinvesters (difference: M
= 0.50 s, t[26] = 2.34, p < .05, 95% CI for difference: 0.06 to 0.93 s). In the skill-
focus and dual-task conditions, the Pressure × Reinvestment Group interaction was 
nonsignifi cant: skill focus, p = .80; dual-task, p = .33; as was the main effect for 
Reinvestment Group: skill focus, p = .90; dual-task, p = .64. In both cases there 
was a signifi cant effect of Pressure: skill focus, F(1, 26) = 27.91, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.52; dual-task, F(1, 26) = 15.57, p < .01, ηp2 = .37. 
Attention Conditions and Performance
Contrasts between performance in the three attention conditions under low 
pressure, collapsed across Reinvestment Group, revealed a signifi cant effect of 
Attention Condition, F(2, 31) = 23.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .60. Pairwise comparisons 
indicated that performance was signifi cantly slower in the skill-focus than in the 
single-task condition (M difference = 0.44 s, t[32] = 5.41, p < .001, 95% CI for 
difference: 0.27 to 0.61 s) and signifi cantly faster in the dual-task than in the single-
task condition (M difference = 0.24 s, t[32] = 3.68, p < .005, 95% CI for difference: 
0.11 to 0.37 s). A signifi cant effect of Attention Condition was also evident in the 
high pressure trials, F(2, 31) = 29.90, p < .001, ηp2 = .66. Relative to single-task 
conditions, pairwise comparisons again indicated slower performance under skill-
focus (M difference = 0.66 s, t[32] = 4.51, p < .001, 95% CI for difference: 0.36 to 
0.95 s) and faster performance under dual-task conditions (M difference = 0.41s, 
t[32] = 6.71, p < .001, 95% CI for difference: 0.29 to 0.53 s).
To test the specifi c prediction regarding performance under pressure in the 
dual-task and single-task conditions, we conducted a paired-samples t-test. This 
revealed that performance under pressure in the dual-task condition was signifi -
cantly better than performance under pressure in the single-task condition, t(32) 
= 6.71, p < .001.
Manipulation Checks
Anxiety Intensity and Direction. Data from the cognitive and somatic anxiety 
subscales of the CSAI-2R were entered into a 2 × 2 (Pressure × Reinvestment 
Group) MANOVA with repeated measures on the Pressure factor. Results of the 
multivariate analyses revealed a signifi cant effect of Pressure, Wilks’ Lambda = 
0.29, F(4, 23) = 14.23, p < .001, ηp2 = .71, and nonsignifi cant effects for both Rein-
vestment Group and the Pressure × Reinvestment Group interaction. Univariate 
analyses of the Pressure effect revealed signifi cant differences for all four factors: 
Cognitive Intensity: F(1, 26) = 20.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .44; Cognitive Direction: F(1, 
26) = 32.45, p < .001, ηp2 = .56; Somatic Intensity: F(1, 26) = 23.75, p < .001, ηp2 
= .48; Somatic Direction: F(1, 26) = 9.71, p < .01, ηp2 = .27. The changes from 
low pressure to high pressure were in the expected direction for Cognitive Intensity 
(17.14 to 22.00), Cognitive Direction (2.68 to –1.25), and Somatic Intensity (13.78 
to 17.14). Unexpectedly, increased somatic anxiety intensity was perceived as being 
more facilitative (Somatic Direction: 2.68 to 5.86), the reason for which is unclear 
and may be a spurious result.
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Pressure Ratings. The pressure-rating question revealed greater perceived 
pressure in the high-pressure (M = 4.57, SD = 1.48) than in the low-pressure trials 
(M = 2.93, SD = 1.27). A 2 × 2 (Pressure × Reinvestment Group) ANOVA with 
repeated measures on the Pressure factor revealed a signifi cant main effect for 
Pressure, F(1, 26) = 54.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .68, and a nonsignifi cant Pressure ×
Reinvestment Group interaction, p = .21, indicating equivalent increases in perceived 
pressure for low and high reinvesters.
Dual-Task Performance. In total, only 11 errors were made in verbalizing 
hand position and these did not differ between reinvestment groups, t(26) = 0.30, 
p = .77. There were no errors or omissions in the random letter-generation task. 
Inspection of the videotapes revealed that nine of the errors in the skill-focused 
condition were attributable to the transitional position of the hands when the tone 
sounded.
Discussion,  Experiment 1
Results from the different attention conditions were consistent with the 
fi ndings of Beilock, Carr, et al. (2002). In particular, the fi nding that low-pressure 
performance was fastest under dual-task conditions and slowest when participants 
monitored hand position replicated Beilock, Carr, et al.’s results for skilled soccer 
players and experienced golfers using the auditory word-monitoring and tone-moni-
toring task, respectively. Specifi cally, Beilock, Carr, et al. found that novices drib-
bling soccer balls using their dominant foot were slower under dual-task conditions 
than under skill-focused conditions whereas the reverse was true for experienced 
players. It should be noted that random letter generation has previously been found 
to suppress primary motor task performance (Bright & Freedman, 1998; Masters, 
1992; MacMahon & Masters, 2002); however, these studies required participants 
to generate letters every 1.5 seconds, increasing to every 1.0 seconds to maintain 
task diffi culty (Baddeley, 1966). 
The dual-task condition in the present study involved auditory monitoring 
for a tone, followed by generation of a random letter. With the comparatively low 
frequency of letter generation (every 6.0 s), it would seem likely that the attentional 
demands were more akin to tone monitoring. In addition, research showing sup-
pressed motor performance under random letter-generation conditions has used 
novice performers for whom concurrent subvocal speech and explicit attention 
to rules may play a supportive role (Kimble & Perlmuter, 1970). Consequently, a 
secondary task that suppresses this process would be expected to have a detrimental 
effect on performance. By contrast, expert performance requires little conscious 
online attention so that attending to secondary tasks should leave performance on 
the primary motor task unaffected (Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002). 
What is less clear is why performance should be better under dual-task than 
single-task conditions. This fi nding occurred in Beilock, Carr, et al.’s study of 
soccer players, and Beilock, Wierenga, et al. (2002) also reported a marginally 
signifi cant improvement in experienced golfers’ putting performance when using 
a concurrent secondary word-monitoring task. One possibility is that the external 
focus required to monitor auditory tones attenuated any residual explicit monitor-
ing that was present under single-task conditions. The benefi ts of an external focus 
have been illustrated in both learning (e.g., Wulf, Lauterbach, & Toole, 1999) and 
performance (Singer, Lidor, & Caraugh, 1993) contexts, and Masters and Maxwell 
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(2004) recently highlighted the similarities between reinvestment / explicit moni-
toring accounts of skill failure and those framed in terms of performers adopting 
an internal focus of attention. 
In terms of the effect of pressure, data in the single-task condition were con-
sistent with Masters et al.’s (1993) prediction that high reinvesters would be more 
susceptible to choking under pressure: high reinvesters slowed signifi cantly more 
than low reinvesters in the high-pressure trials. However, the fi nding that perfor-
mance deterioration in the skill-focus condition was compounded by high pressure 
is inconsistent with the skill-focus condition, replicating the effect of pressure. One 
possibility is that performers can vary the extent to which they explicitly monitor 
performance and that this results in varying degrees of performance disruption. Thus, 
rather than explicit monitoring being a single discrete state, there may be varying 
degrees to which performers explicitly monitor their performance. Accordingly, 
skill-focused and pressure-induced explicit monitoring may have additive effects, 
resulting in even poorer performance when both occur simultaneously. This inter-
pretation is consistent with recent challenges to the dichotomous account of explicit 
and implicit processes, whereby researchers have argued that learning invariably 
involves a contribution from both processes (see Jackson & Farrow, 2005).
Consistent with this view, Smeeton, Williams, Hodges, and Ward (2005) 
found that the degree to which decision time slowed under pressure in a group 
who had learned a skill explicitly was strongly and linearly related (r = .76) to the 
number of explicit rules they recalled at the end of the experiment. This would also 
help account for the fi nding that performance under dual-task conditions was still 
poorer under high pressure, albeit performance returned to a level approximately 
equivalent to the low-pressure single-task condition. Thus, the dual-task condi-
tion can be viewed as counteracting the tendency for pressure to invoke explicit 
monitoring. 
Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, adopting a skill focus had a detrimental effect on skilled 
motor performance while the dual-task condition facilitated performance. In Experi-
ment 2 we sought to replicate the fi rst fi nding while examining the effects of focusing 
on a task-relevant secondary task: process goals. Process goals refer to behaviors 
the performer will engage in during performance (Kingston & Hardy, 1997, p. 279), 
and Kingston and Hardy gave an example of a highly successful pistol shooter who 
described using a mental checklist of words representing “every single step involved 
in shooting a shot” to maintain motivation for quality training (p. 280). Although 
somewhat limited, researchers have previously highlighted several benefi ts associ-
ated with setting process goals. For example, Kingston and Hardy found that club 
golfers who set process goals over a 1-year period experienced greater increases 
in self-effi cacy and concentration, and decreases in cognitive anxiety, than a group 
setting performance goals. In addition, Filby, Maynard, and Graydon (1999) found 
that performers who used a combination of outcome and process goals scored sig-
nifi cantly more points on a kicking accuracy task than those setting either process 
or outcome goals alone. 
When set in the context of explicit monitoring theories, process goals present 
an apparent paradox in that they appear to encourage performers to focus consciously 
on aspects of performance that are normally performed automatically (Hardy et al., 
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1996). Kingston and Hardy (1997) proposed one explanation, namely that process 
goals may serve different functions in skilled and less-able performers. For skilled 
performers, Kingston and Hardy argued that process goals function as holistic, 
conceptual cues for the to-be-performed behavior. For less-able performers, they 
suggested that process goals enhance performance through focusing attention on 
key elements of performance. This functional account is consistent with the fi nd-
ing that explicit monitoring facilitates performance in novices but disrupts skilled 
performance (Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002). In the context of reinvestment theory and 
performance under pressure, it gives rise to the possibility that process goals may 
invoke different attentional functions according to changes in perceived pressure 
and/or individual propensity for exerting conscious control over performance. 
In Experiment 2 we sought to examine this issue. Specifi cally, we predicted 
that process goals would function as conceptual cues under low pressure, but would 
trigger explicit monitoring under high pressure. We therefore hypothesized that 
focusing on a process goal would facilitate performance under low pressure but 
would have a negative impact on performance under high pressure. Consistent with 
conceptualization of the Reinvestment Scale, we further predicted that this effect 
would be most pronounced in high reinvesters. 
Method
Participants and Measures
Twenty-fi ve male varsity soccer players (mean age 20.4 years, SD = 1.1) 
consented in writing to take part in the study. Participants were current representa-
tives of university fi rst or second teams and had played competitive-level soccer 
for a mean of 12.44 years (SD = 2.71). Twenty-one participants were right-footed 
and four were left-footed; all played in outfi eld positions.
The Reinvestment Scale and the cognitive and somatic items from the CSAI-
2R were again used (see Experiment 1). As in Experiment 1, a single question 
assessing perceived pressure was used as an additional manipulation check.
Design and Procedure
The soccer-dribbling task used by Beilock, Carr, et al. (2002) was chosen for 
the present study. The task was set up on a carpeted surface and required participants 
to dribble a soccer ball as quickly and accurately as possible through a series of 6 
cones spaced at 1.5-m intervals (total length = 10.5 m) using the instep and outstep 
of their dominant foot. Newtest PowerTimer 1.0 photoelectric cells were again 
placed in the start and fi nish gates to record trial completion time to the nearest 
millisecond. The procedure for Experiment 2 was the same as for Experiment 1 with 
the exception that participants completed 3 trials in each combination of attention 
and pressure, generating a total of 18 trials. Again, trials were counterbalanced with 
respect to both attention and pressure conditions.
Single-Task. Participants were instructed to complete the task as quickly 
and accurately as possible and were informed that the time taken to complete each 
trial would be used as the measure of performance.
Skill-Focus. Participants were additionally instructed to attend to the side 
of their foot that made contact with the ball throughout the trial. To ensure adher-
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ence to this instruction, participants were instructed, upon hearing a tone, to report 
which side of their foot had just touched the ball. The tone sounded on a 6-second 
variable interval schedule.
Process Goal. In the process goal condition, participants were asked to set 
a single goal regarding their ball-dribbling behavior to try to maximize success on 
the task. To help them formulate their goal, the experimenter gave the example 
of a golfer ensuring that his/her alignment was appropriate prior to playing a shot 
(Kingston & Swain, 1999). Participants then restated their process goal prior to 
beginning each trial in the process goal condition. 
Pressure Manipulation. As in Experiment 1, a video camera and cover 
story were used to manipulate pressure. Specifi cally, prior to the high pressure 
trials the participants were informed that they would be fi lmed and that the footage 
would be used by coaches at a local English Premiership team’s soccer academy 
to evaluate their performance relative to academy players of different ages. At the 
end of the study, the participants were fully debriefed as to the nature and purpose 
of the study. 
Results of Experiment 2
A median split was performed on total Reinvestment Scale score to create a 
group of high (n = 13) and low reinvesters (n = 12), with mean scores of 52.42 (SD = 
5.65, range from 46 to 64) and 38.00 (SD = 6.03, range from 28 to 44), respectively. 
Mean trial completion time served as the dependent variable and alpha was set at 
.05. Multivariate results are reported, and effect size is indicated by multivariate 
partial Eta squared (ηp2).
Attention, Reinvestment, and Performance
The analysis was focused on two questions. First, how did setting a process 
goal affect performance relative to the single-task and skill-focus conditions? 
Second, did performance in the process goal condition interact with pressure and/
or reinvestment group? To answer these questions, we fi rst entered the data into a 
3 × 2 × 2 (Attention Condition × Pressure × Reinvestment Group) ANOVA, with 
repeated measures on the fi rst two factors. Results of the multivariate analysis 
revealed a signifi cant main effect for Attention Condition, F(2, 22) = 38.65, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .78, with planned contrasts indicating faster performance in the single-
task condition (M = 5.38, SE = 1.07) than in the process goal condition (M = 5.79, 
SE = 1.24), F(1, 23) = 14.00, p < .001, ηp2 = .38, which in turn was faster than the 
skill-focus condition (M = 6.20, SE = 1.11), F(1, 23) = 16.52, p < .001, ηp2 = .42. 
The hypothesis that process goals would facilitate performance under low pressure 
but have an adverse effect on performance under high pressure was not supported. 
Specifi cally, the interaction between Attention Condition and Pressure, F(2, 46) = 
0.36, p = .70, ηp2 = .02, and its higher-order interaction with Reinvestment Group, 
F(2, 46) = 0.13, p = .88, ηp2 = .01, were nonsignifi cant. Thus, the adverse effect of 
attending to a process goal was equivalent under low- and high-pressure conditions 
for both low and high reinvesters. 
The main effect of Attention Condition was moderated by a signifi cant 
Attention Condition × Reinvestment Group interaction, F(2, 22) = 4.27, p < .05, 
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ηp2 = .28. Follow-up analysis revealed similar times for high and low reinvesters 
in the process goal condition (M Difference = 0.09 s; t[23] = 0.42, p = .68; 95% CI 
for Difference = –0.36 to 0.55) and signifi cantly longer times for low reinvesters 
than for high reinvesters in the skill-focus condition (M Difference = 0.50 s; t[23] 
= 2.75, p < .05; 95% CI for Difference = 0.13 to 0.88) relative to the single-task 
condition (see Figure 2). In terms of the effect of pressure, planned comparisons 
between performance under low and high pressure in the single-task condition 
revealed a marginally signifi cant difference in the expected direction for high 
reinvesters (M Difference = 0.25 s; t[11] = 1.75, p = .05) and a null fi nding for 
low reinvesters (M Difference = 0.00 s; t[12] = 0.05, p = .96). However, the main 
effect and higher-order interactions associated with Pressure were nonsignifi cant 
in the three-way ANOVA. 
Given the detrimental effect of the process goal condition, we decided to 
conduct an a posteriori analysis of the nature of process goals that were set. Two 
types of process goal were identifi ed: movement related goals (n = 16) which 
included reference to a specifi c technique or movement (e.g., “keep loose with 
knees bent”), and position related goals (n = 8) that specifi ed either the position of 
the ball in relation to the performer or the performer in relation to the course (e.g., 
“keep over the ball with my body”). All but one of the participants set a goal that 
could be classifi ed as movement related or position related. Classifi cation of the 
goals by an independent rater who was given the goal statements and defi nitions 
revealed 100% agreement with the experimenter’s classifi cation. A 2 × 2 (Attention 
Condition × Goal Type) ANOVA was subsequently performed that revealed a 
signifi cant interaction, F(1, 22) = 18.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .46. Movement related 
goals, but not position related ones, were found to have a detrimental effect on 
performance relative to the single-task condition (see Figure 3). 
Figure 2 — Mean trial completion time differences relative to the single-task condition 
(Experiment 2) for high and low reinvesters, with standard error bars.
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Manipulation Checks
Anxiety Intensity and Direction. Data from the cognitive and somatic 
anxiety subscales of the CSAI-2R revealed changes in the expected direction for 
all variables from the low-pressure to high-pressure condition: Cognitive Intensity: 
16.49 to 19.60; Cognitive Direction: 0.51 to –4.30; Somatic Intensity: 14.15 to 16.89; 
Somatic Direction: 2.86 to 0.16. Results of a 2 × 2 (Pressure × Reinvestment Group) 
MANOVA with repeated measures on the Pressure factor revealed a signifi cant 
effect of Pressure, F(4, 20) = 9.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .64, and nonsignifi cant effects 
for both Reinvestment Group and the Pressure × Reinvestment Group interaction 
(p = .44 and p = .19, respectively). Results of the univariate analysis for Pressure 
revealed signifi cant differences in all four factors: Cognitive Intensity: F(1, 23) = 
32.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .59; Cognitive Direction: F(1, 23) = 14.25, p < .01, ηp2 = .38; 
Somatic Intensity: F(1, 23) = 15.67, p < .01, ηp2 = .41; Somatic Direction: F(1, 23) 
= 6.03, p < .05, ηp2 = .21.
Pressure Ratings. Data from the pressure rating scale revealed signifi cantly 
higher perceived pressure in the high-pressure trials (M = 4.84) than in the low-
pressure trials (M = 3.19), p < .001, ηp2 = .76, a difference that was equivalent for 
low and high reinvesters (Pressure × Reinvestment Group interaction: p = .59). 
Dual-Task Performance. Participants made a total of only three errors when 
verbalizing which side of the foot had just touched the ball. 
Discussion, Experiment 2
The hypothesis that process goals would have differential effects on 
performance according to dispositional reinvestment and pressure was not supported. 
Figure 3 — Mean trial completion times for participants setting movement related (n
= 16) and position related (n = 8) process goals, with standard error bars.
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Movement related process goals were found to be detrimental to performance 
regardless of dispositional reinvestment or situational pressure. This suggests a 
need to distinguish between different types of process goal that may be associated 
with different attentional functions. On the one hand, process goals relating to 
skilled movements may encourage explicit monitoring while those relating to 
more strategic features of positioning may direct the performer’s attention away 
from the physical movements being performed, functioning as holistic cues for the 
required behavior (Kingston & Hardy, 1997; see also Jackson & Willson, 1999). 
Consistent with this point, Kingston and Hardy identifi ed “a process goal orientation 
as the most appropriate primary focus for competition” (p. 290) but acknowledged 
the paradoxical nature of advice to set process goals yet not engage in conscious 
processing. 
This suggestion is also consistent with Beilock, Carr, et al.’s (2002) proposed 
distinction between self-regulatory attention and skill-focused attention. Specifi cally, 
process goals relating to strategic features of a task may engage attentional processes 
that serve higher level, metacognitive roles, thereby preventing focus on the step-
by-step processes governing skill execution. 
Consistent with Experiment 1, skill-focused attention again had a detrimental 
effect on dribbling speed relative to the single-task condition, and high reinvesters 
again showed a greater, albeit marginally signifi cant, tendency toward poorer 
performance under pressure in the single-task condition. Interestingly, the adverse 
effect of adopting a skill focus was more pronounced in low reinvesters. This is 
consistent with an extension of the “acclimatization” hypothesis (Baumeister, 1984) 
which suggests that low reinvesters may be less used to focusing on the processes 
governing performance, hence being more prone to choking. Although apparently 
at odds with one another, the reinvestment and acclimatization accounts are not 
entirely irreconcilable. If low reinvesters tend to engage in explicit monitoring less 
than high reinvesters, then instructing low reinvesters to do so would be predicted 
to have a more negative impact on performance than for high reinvesters. At 
the same time, low reinvesters might still have a lower propensity for actually 
engaging in this process under pressure. Before speculating further, there is a need 
for additional research to establish whether this fi nding is robust, particularly given 
that the equivalent effect in Experiment 1 was not statistically signifi cant. 
In terms of pressure, it is unclear why the same manipulation had a less 
negative impact on performance than in Experiment 1, despite resulting in 
comparable changes in preperformance anxiety intensity and pressure ratings. 
One possibility relates to task complexity. The hockey-dribbling task may be 
considered more complex than the soccer-dribbling task by virtue of the U-shaped 
as opposed to “straight line” design of the course and the need to use a hand-held 
implement to control a smaller ball. This may have decreased the sensitivity of the 
soccer-dribbling task to performance effects resulting from changes in situational 
pressure. For example, MacMahon and Masters (2002) found that random letter 
generation did not disrupt performance on short (1.5 m) straight golf putts, but that it 
signifi cantly suppressed performance on longer (3.0 m), curved putts. Thus, although 
the pattern of results with respect to pressure was largely consistent with Experiment 
1, a degree of caution should be expressed when interpreting nonsignifi cant effects 
relating to pressure.
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General Discussion
The aim of the present studies was to evaluate the relationship between 
attentional focus, dispositional reinvestment, and skill failure under pressure. 
Researchers have proposed that skill-focused attention, or explicit monitoring, is 
central to choking but have tended to manipulate attention or pressure in isolation, 
thereby providing only indirect evidence of the link between the two (Liao & 
Masters, 2002). The present studies manipulated both attentional focus and pressure 
in addition to examining the relative performance of individuals with a low and 
high propensity for reinvesting conscious control.
The results were consistent with explicit monitoring theories of skill failure, 
with the cumulative detrimental effects of pressure and skill focus observed in 
Experiment 1 suggesting that explicit processes could be activated to varying degrees 
with resultant varying degrees of disruption. However, two possible limitations 
should be noted. First, a possible limitation of the skill-focus manipulation used in 
this and previous research (Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002) is that one cannot ensure that 
participants actually monitor their movements in accordance with the instruction. 
Specifi cally, although they are asked to monitor their movements, they are only 
asked to report one feature of their movement in response to the tone. In this 
situation, participants may attempt to recall hand or foot position each time they 
hear the tone but not actually monitor their movements over the duration of the 
trial. We argue that the low number of tones on each trial coupled with the very low 
number of judgment errors and negative impact on performance mitigates against 
this possibility, but it cannot entirely be discounted. 
A second potential limitation is that the negative impact of skill-focus 
instructions and focusing on movement related goals may have been due to 
participants performing the skill in a novel fashion. Thus, being asked to monitor 
features of performance is likely to be novel for skilled performers and would 
also account for the differential effects of such instructions in skilled and novice 
participants observed in previous work (Beilock, Carr, et al., 2002). Following 
this line of reasoning, it is also possible that skilled soccer players would routinely 
monitor elements of position on this task. Consequently, setting an explicit position 
related goal could be accommodated within their normal focus of attention. Set 
against this possibility, performance under dual-task conditions might also be 
considered novel, particularly if performers are prevented from routinely monitoring 
elements of positioning. Nevertheless, additional research is needed to establish 
to what degree the breakdown in skilled performance under skill-focus conditions 
is due to explicit monitoring and to what extent it is due to performing the skill in 
a novel fashion. 
One other possibility warrants mentioning, as it relates to the conceptual 
distinction between explicit monitoring and reinvestment of conscious control. 
While researchers have highlighted similarities between explicit monitoring and 
reinvestment accounts of skill failure (Masters & Maxwell, 2004), the terms are 
logically distinct insofar as instructions to monitor and report a particular feature 
of performance encourage explicit monitoring but do not specifi cally encourage 
conscious control. Thus, it is possible that explicit monitoring has a general disruptive 
effect on motor performance and that additional disruption occurs when performers 
attempt to apply explicit rules to control as well as monitor their movements. 
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This would potentially account for the additive detrimental effect of skill 
focus and pressure observed in Experiment 1 if the skill-focus instruction prompts 
explicit monitoring while increased pressure prompts the participant to attempt 
to control those elements that are being monitored. For example, in their initial 
validation of the Reinvestment Scale, Masters et al. (1993) found that performance 
on a rod-tracing task was considerably slower under pressure but that decrements in 
performance were equivalent for both low and high reinvesters. In explaining their 
results, Masters et al. appealed to the lack of explicit rules associated with the task 
and subsequently demonstrated interactions between reinvestment and choking on 
a more complex, rule-bound, golf-putting task. 
The theoretical and practical significance of this distinction could be 
determined by employing dual-task methodology to assess “on-line” attentional 
demands. For example, Gray (2004) measured performers’ ability to monitor 
extraneous and task-relevant information while performing a simulated baseball 
task under a variety of conditions. He found that experts were better able to report 
extraneous information (tone frequency) than novices, and that expert batters’ 
performance over the previous 24 trials was strongly correlated (r = .89) with their 
ability to make a retrospective judgment about whether the bat had been moving 
downward or upward at the instant a tone sounded. If explicit monitoring is necessary 
but not suffi cient for reinvestment of conscious control, the latter should be more 
demanding of attention, as refl ected in a reduced ability to attend to extraneous 
information during performance. 
Similar techniques could be used to shed additional light on the processes 
underlying the behavioral effects observed in the present experiments. For example, 
the results of Experiment 2 highlighted differential performance effects associated 
with focusing on different types of process goals but did not establish a direct link 
between attending to movement related goals and explicit monitoring. If certain 
process goals cue explicit monitoring while others cue automatic execution of the 
skill, this should be refl ected in the ability to monitor task-relevant and extraneous 
information. Similarly, the fact that the Reinvestment Scale takes its name from the 
process of reinvesting conscious control is perhaps a little misleading, as the scale 
does not attempt to measure the process of reinvestment directly but instead aims 
to bring together conceptually linked items that predict this process. 
Consequently, while the results of the present experiments were largely 
consistent with the prediction that high reinvesters would show a greater propensity 
for choking (Masters et al., 1993), further research is needed to establish the validity 
of the scale in terms of predicting the process of reinvesting conscious control. 
Again, this could be achieved via on-line monitoring of attentional demands during 
task performance. Finally, there is a need to evaluate the predictive validity of 
the Reinvestment Scale in terms of choking and/or the process of reinvestment 
in an ecologically valid setting to supplement evidence obtained from novice 
performers in learning paradigms and that from subjective ratings of propensity 
for skill failure. 
As Kimble and Perlmuter (1970) observed, “the act of paying attention to… 
performances or describing the steps as they occur tends to destroy the automaticity 
of such behavior” (p. 375). A growing body of research is supportive of this statement 
and the present results provide further support for explicit monitoring theories of 
choking and predictions regarding the relative vulnerability of high reinvesters to 
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such effects. At the same time, issues still remain regarding the nature and number 
of processes underlying skill failure, as well as the validity of the Reinvestment 
Scale in terms of predicting such processes. 
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